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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Conclusions to  
USIB-D-24.7/3  
(SC-11879/65 - 22 October 1965)  
26 October 1965  
Limited Distribution

#### CONCLUSIONS

A. The most important source of manpower and supplies for the Viet Cong is South Vietnam itself. The Viet Cong have developed an effective logistic system which procures from internal sources almost all the supplies used by the Viet Cong. Important military materiel unavailable locally is obtained from external sources.

B. Within South Vietnam the Viet Cong transportation system and network of supply bases are indispensable to the operations of their forces at anything approaching the present level of military activity. The volume of supplies moving internally and the total stockpile in the supply bases cannot be determined from present evidence.

C. The Viet Cong are increasingly dependent on outside sources for arms and ammunition, certain technical equipment, medical supplies, cadre personnel, and trained technicians. These move into South Vietnam via three principal routes, as follows:

1. The Laotian corridor, which is continuously being improved, is the principal route for the movement of personnel and supplies from

**\*NSC Review Completed\***

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North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Supplies moved over this route are destined primarily for the northern and central highland areas.

2. The sea route from North Vietnam is probably being used less at this time, although it played an important part in stocking the supply bases in the southern and coastal parts of the country. The use of alternative routes for maintaining stocks of military materiel in these areas has not been detected.

3. Relatively convenient land and water routes from Cambodia provide direct access to the southern part of South Vietnam for the movement of supplies largely commercially procurable in Cambodia. Although there is cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower Cambodian government and military levels, central government policy, while generally favorable to the Viet Cong, stops short of military support.

D. Although it is impossible to compute the total amount of supplies available for infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam, it appears that the daily average thus far during 1965 has been at least 5 tons and may have been more than 8 tons. These amounts, primarily delivered

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by truck in the past dry season, may have been supplemented by additional supplies moved by porters and other means of transport. The additional amounts cannot be quantified. We have also been unable to determine comparable figures for the sea route from North Vietnam and the land and water routes from Cambodia. However, what evidence there is leads to the conclusion that the tonnages moving over these latter routes are significantly less than the tonnage moving through Laos.

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